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The Polish and Romanian experiences show that party elites
need to loosen control when introducing primary elections to
select candidates
The Conservatives experimented with primaries at the 2010 general election, and Ed Miliband has recently
proposed their wider introduction to choose Labour Party candidates. Sergiu Gherghina and Michal Radecki
believe primary elections can bring significant benefits for parties and democracy as a whole, but warn that the
UK needs to avoid mistakes made in Poland and Romania when primaries were first introduced in these
countries.
In the last couple of decades inclusive means to select the candidates for legislative elections have gained
momentum throughout Europe. A growing number of political parties have introduced internal elections in the
forms of primaries – often available only to party members.
Moves towards inclusive selection procedure are likely to bring political parties a series of benefits. One of them is
that party membership becomes more attractive by opening the decision-making process and allowing members
to make their voice heard. At the same time, primaries convey a message of transparency and intra-party
democracy. Both features can be powerful vehicles to improve the party image and electoral performance. Since
primaries are not common events, they bring media coverage and put the parties in the spotlight. Another
important benefit is the quality of candidates since primaries enlarge the pool of recruitment, filter the most
appropriate candidates and prepare them for competition with outside opponents.
However, the attempts to introduce primaries are not always successful. Two examples from Eastern Europe
illustrate how mishandled primaries fail to deliver any promised expected benefits. Their mistakes can constitute a
useful lesson for those parties planning to adopt inclusive selection mechanisms, including the Labour Party in the
UK. In chronological order, the Polish Civic Platform (PO) and the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD) have
abandoned primaries after a single use in 2001 and 2004 respectively. Both countries used at the time a
proportional representation electoral system and primaries were organized to determine the position of candidates
on the lists (compiled at regional / county level).
In addition to these top-down limitations, several problems occurred during primaries. One of them was the
practice of conveyance by activists belonging to SKL (Conservative-People’s Party, which was one of political
groups that created PO) who transported party members by bus to vote for their candidates. Another problem was
vote buying. Both SKL politicians and those close to the party founders accused each other of providing free
alcohol and food to activists entitled to vote. Additionally, in a few cities allegations were made against the
winners. Finally, internal tensions emerged after the leaders altered the results of primaries according to their own
interests.
The PSD introduced primaries as a strategy to improve its image affected by corruption allegations and to gain
electoral support in the fierce competition against the opposition coalition. Instead of achieving these goals, the
organisation of the primaries was plagued by a great number of problems. One of these was the rigging of votes,
PO decided to use primaries immediately after its formation with two strategic aims. It emerged before the 2001
parliamentary elections as a loose civic movement and primaries were designed to attract potential supporters
since the PO aimed to establish itself as a political actor. These primaries were presented as the first open and
democratic event in Polish party politics and thus media coverage was quite likely to be high. Several decisions of
the party leaders altered the functioning of primaries. They appointed regional coordinators, responsible only to
them, and organized the regional primaries. Party leaders kept the final say regarding who could run in primaries
and who was finally selected. The leaders could (and actually did) eliminate candidates from primaries on ethical
or policy grounds and remove those already selected if compromising information showed up.
which even led to some winners having more votes than turnout. Another point of discontent among candidates
has been the asymmetric access to resources. Local leaders competing in primaries were also in charge of their
organisation and could thus appoint their supporters in key positions. Some complaints of electoral fraud referred
to the activities of such supporters and even candidates who showed party members how to vote or even voted for
them.
In addition, there was a structural problem with the voting process. The PSD used a computer-assisted voting
system that had never been used before by any Romanian citizen (legislative elections are exclusively paper-
based). The poor information provided to party members regarding this new system made them ask for help from
the election committee. Thus, in many instances there was a public voting rather than a secret one. The intra-
party tensions created by these problems were fuelled by the decision of the party leaders to change the results of
the primaries.
What can the UK parties learn from these two examples? We argue that at least three things:
First, primaries that remain controlled by the central elite make little sense. Both situations showed that
top-down intervention has generated intra-party conflicts.
Second, the shift to a more inclusive candidate selection has to be organised to the last detail. If not, there
is a danger of boomerang effect in which envisaged benefits can go against the party. To refer to one of the
examples, the PSD primaries are often qualified by its opponents as “masquerade” and they have many
reasons to attach such a label to that process. In contrast, the PO appeared to learn its lesson: the 2010
primaries organized to nominate a presidential candidate for national elections were better organized and
led to minimal internal conflict.
Third, the primaries are not a smooth process for the party organization. Along the way, clashes between
local branches may emerge (as in the PO) or between leaders (PSD). Also, the party may also expect to
lose some important members unhappy with their defeat.
Nevertheless, if the British parties can cope with these challenges, the adoption of primaries will be rewarding in
the short (for instance improving communication with members and voters) and the long-term (achieving a better
quality of government). In light of their rich experience in democratic politics the obstacles are likely to be smaller
than in the new European democracies.
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